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Abstract: 
This research demonstrates that conspiracy theories Ð often represented as subversive 
alternatives to establishment narratives Ð may bolster, rather than undermine, support for the 
social status quo when its legitimacy is under threat.  A pilot study (N = 98) found a positive 
relationship between conspiracy belief and satisfaction with the status quo.  In Study 1 (N = 
120), threatening (vs. affirming) the status quo in British society caused participants to 
endorse conspiracy theories.  In Study 2 (N = 159), exposure to conspiracy theories increased 
satisfaction with the British social system after this had been experimentally threatened.  In 
Study 3 (N = 109), this effect was mediated by the tendency for participants exposed (vs. not 
exposed) to conspiracy theories to attribute societal problems relatively more strongly to 
small groups of people rather than systemic causes.  By blaming tragedies, disasters and 
social problems on the actions of a malign few, conspiracy theories can divert attention from 
the inherent limitations of social systems.   
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Blaming a few bad apples to save a threatened barrel: The system-justifying function of  
conspiracy theories 
 Conspiracy theories blame significant events on the secret actions of powerful, 
malevolent and unjust actors (Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Goertzel, 1994; Wood, Douglas & 
Sutton, 2012).  They range from wildly implausible (e.g., the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was 
triggered by U.S. government scientists), through unlikely (e.g., the U.S. government 
orchestrated, or was complicit in, the 9/11 attacks), to demonstrably true (e.g., conspiracy 
theories circulating prior to the truth being revealed about the Watergate, Iran-Contra, and 
Tuskegee syphilis scandals).  Although their plausibility varies and their ÒtruthÓ also varies, 
one thing that they seem to have in common is that they are predominantly subversive.  The 
majority of conspiracy theories point accusing fingers at authority, and offer alternatives to 
official explanations (Gray, 2010; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013).  
Their proponents often represent skeptics as gullible conformists, or ÒsheepleÓ (Natrass, 
2012).  Scholars have also written about conspiracy theoriesÕ capacity to confront social 
hierarchies and to offer alternative, empowering understandings of social reality (e.g., Gray, 
2010; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013).       
Several findings provide support for this view.  Endorsement of conspiracy theories is 
robustly associated with anomie and political distrust (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, 
& Gregory, 1999; Goertzel, 1994).  Exposure to conspiracy theories undermines peopleÕs 
confidence in their work (Douglas & Leite, in press), their confidence in governmental 
positions on topics such as climate science, and compliance with officially encouraged 
actions such as voting and vaccinating children (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; 2014b; 
Lewandowsky, Oberauer & Gignac, 2013).  Also, belief in conspiracy theories appears to be 
especially strong among members of disaffected minority groups (Crocker, Luhtanen, 
Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999); victimized groups (Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, & Wjcik, 
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2013), and those with extreme political leanings (van Prooijen, Krouwel & Pollet, 2015).  
Entertaining conspiracy beliefs, then, would seem to be at odds with a well-documented 
motivation Ð system justification.     
System justification theory proposes that people are motivated to hold positive views 
about existing social, economic and political arrangements (Jost & Andrews, 2011; Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Kay, Jost & Young, 2005; Kay, Gaucher, Peach, 
Laurin, Friesen, Zanna, & Spencer, 2009).  This motivation arises because system 
justification symbolically satisfies relational, epistemic, and existential needs.  Threats to the 
fairness, integrity and legitimacy of social systems threaten these needs, causing people to 
defend, bolster or rationalize the status quo, even at the expense of their own interests (Jost et 
al., 2004).  For example, people use stereotypes to justify status differences between groups 
(Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost, 2001; Jost & Hunyady, 2002), and employ other ideological 
devices such as rationalization and outgroup favouritism to preserve the legitimacy of the 
social system (Jost & Hunyady, 2002).  The meaning of the Òstatus quoÓ or the Òsocial 
systemÓ can mean different things to people in different contexts, but system justification 
theory refers to a general satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the systems on which people rely 
in their everyday lives.  
Why do people subscribe to conspiracy beliefs when they appear to be so critical of 
authorities and institutions?  One possible answer is that like system justification, conspiracy 
beliefs satisfy important psychological needs, allowing people to make sense of events (van 
Prooijen, 2012), avoid feelings of uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, 
Galinsky, & Kay, 2015), avoid existential anxiety (Newheiser, Farias & Tausch, 2011), help 
make sense of a chaotic world (Quinby, 1999), address feelings of powerlessness (Abalakina-
Paap, et al., 1999; van Prooijen & Acker, 2015), deal with a lack of control (Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008), protect the image of the ingroup (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de 
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Zavala & Olechowski, 2016; Cichocka Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala & Olechowski, 2016), 
and cope with disadvantage (Crocker et al., 1999).  Conspiracy theorizing may represent a 
substitute route to these needs when system justification is untenable.   
We propose an alternative possibility, which is that conspiracy theories may 
paradoxically bolster support for the status quo when its legitimacy is threatened.  As noted 
by Goertzel (2010), Òa conspiracy theory gives believers someone tangible to blame for their 
perceived predicament, instead of blaming it on impersonal or abstract social forcesÓ (p. 
494).  Specifically, conspiracy theories identify a small group of wrongdoers within the 
system who are responsible for the ills of society.  These wrongdoers are not represented as 
being characteristic of society more generally, but instead are people working for special 
interests, such as corporations or corrupt elements within government, and against those of 
wider society. Conspiracy theories may therefore sometimes deflect blame for societyÕs 
problems from the inherent features of social systems to the alleged malfeasance of small 
groups of people.  Thus, conspiracy theories postulate that illegitimate and unjust factors 
influence peopleÕs lives, but often nominate factors that are not inherent to social systems.    
In this way, the motivated defence of social systems via conspiracy theories is 
analogous to the preservation of many cherished social beliefs.  Subtyping preserves group 
stereotypes by categorizing people who defy them as members of special subgroups (Kunda 
& Oleson, 1995).  Similarly, in order to defend beliefs that the world is just, people demonize 
wrongdoers, ascribing to them evil dispositions that make them unrepresentative of normal 
people (Ellard, Miller, Baumle, & Olson, 2002; Fouts, Callan, Piasnetin, & Lawson, 2006).  
Likewise, people derogate deviant ingroup members more harshly than deviant outgroup 
members, in order, ironically, to preserve the belief that typical ingroup members are superior 
to typical outgroup members (Marques & Paez, 1994).  In all these cases, people attribute 
disconfirmatory phenomena to particular causal factors such as individualsÕ personality traits.  
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In so doing, they can avoid revising beliefs about more general entities such as social groups.  
Also, people often view problems in society as inevitable and therefore need to find ways to 
adapt to them (Laurin, Gaucher & Kay, 2013).  Believing in conspiracy theories may give 
people the opportunity to do so by attributing problems to the negative actions of outsiders 
whilst not questioning the system itself.   
In sum, there are grounds to predict that conspiracy theories may undermine support 
for the status quo, and grounds to predict that they may bolster it.  However, no research has 
directly examined these predictions.  We report a correlational pilot study and three 
experiments testing the novel proposal that conspiracy theories may bolster (vs. undermine) 
support for the status quo.  The pilot study examined the relationship between conspiracy 
theorizing and support for the social status quo.  Study 1 examined whether conspiracy 
theorizing would increase (vs. not increase) in response to Òsystem threatÓ information.  
Study 2 tested the hypothesis that exposure to conspiracy theories would buffer (vs. 
aggravate) the negative effects of system threat on a measure of satisfaction with the status 
quo.  Finally, Study 3 examined the mediating role of the attribution of societal problems to 
individual perpetrators rather than social systems.  In the pilot study and in Study 1, we 
focused on belief in several well-known conspiracy theories and also the general tendency to 
think conspiratorially.  In subsequent studies, we aimed for greater experimental control by 
focusing on conspiracy theories in one particular context.  
Pilot Study 
We first report a pilot study that examined the relationship between conspiracy belief 
and satisfaction with the status quo.  Evidence of such a relationship would provide grounds 
for experimental studies examining the effects of system threat and conspiracy theories on 
satisfaction with the status quo.  Participants completed scale measures of conspiracy belief 
and system justification.  If conspiracy theories tend to subvert the status quo, we can expect 
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a negative correlation between these beliefs.  If conspiracy theories help to uphold the status 
quo, this correlation should be positive.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Ninety-eight undergraduate students at a British University (25 men and 73 women, 
Mage = 20.38, SD = 4.38) gave their informed consent to participate in an online questionnaire 
for course credit.  In this and all other studies reported in this paper, the questionnaire 
management software Qualtrics was used and the universityÕs Psychology Ethics Committee 
granted ethics approval.  Belief in both real-world conspiracy theories and general notions of 
conspiracy were measured as the predictor variables and satisfaction with the status quo was 
measured as the criterion variable.  A medium-sized correlation between variables required a 
sample size of approximately 85 participants for 80% power of detecting the effect.  We 
therefore targeted 98-102 participants, anticipating a 15-20% dropout. 
Materials and Procedure 
Conspiracy beliefs were measured using a scale assessing belief in real-world 
conspiracy theories (Douglas & Sutton, 2011).  There were 17 statements (e.g., ÒThe British 
government was involved in the death of Princess DianaÓ, 1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = 
extremely likely, α = .93).  Further, a scale was used to measure belief in general notions of 
conspiracy (Brotherton, French & Pickering, 2013).  There were 15 statements (e.g., ÒThe 
government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, 
and keeps this a secretÓ, 1 = definitely not true, 5 = definitely true, α = .94).  Satisfaction with 
the status quo was measured using Kay and JostÕs (2003) general system justification scale.  
Participants responded to eight items (e.g., ÒIn general, I find society to be fairÓ, 1 = strongly 
disagree, 9 = strongly agree, α = .80), with higher scores indicating greater support for the 
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status quo.  The order of the scales was randomized.  At the conclusion of the pilot study, the 
participants were debriefed in writing and were thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
Belief in real-world conspiracy theories was positively correlated with belief in 
general notions of conspiracy, r(98) = .82, p < .001.  Using oblique rotation (promax), we 
conducted an exploratory factor analysis of the individual items of both scales.  The scales 
were used in this pilot study and Study 1, so the factor analysis was conducted across data 
from this study and Study 1 in order to increase power.  Statistical assumptions were met and 
the analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues > 1, explaining 43.38 per cent and 6.83 per 
cent of the variance respectively.  Each component showed strong loadings on the rotated 
solution, and each item loaded substantially on the predicted scale, with the exception of two 
items from the real-world conspiracy scale which cross-loaded on the general notions of 
conspiracy (conspiracies about JFK and aliens).  Results were not affected when these two 
items were omitted from the real-world conspiracy scale.  
 
Belief in real-world conspiracy theories and general notions of conspiracy were 
positively correlated with satisfaction with the status quo, r(98) = .23, p = .024, r(98) = .32, p 
< .001, respectively.  That is, participants who endorsed conspiracy theories perceived 
society to be fairer, more legitimate and more secure.
1 
 This study therefore provides some 
preliminary evidence that conspiracy theories may serve a system-justifying function.  We 
                                                             
1
 The pilot study also measured values (Schwartz, 1992), reasoning that security, conformity and 
tradition (conservation values) are relevant to the idea of upholding positive perceptions of social 
systems.  We also measured need for cognitive closure (NFCC; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), 
reasoning that this could be associated with belief in conspiracy theories that address uncertainty (van 
Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013).  Only system-justification and the NFCC subscale of closed-mindedness 
were consistent predictors of conspiracy beliefs (see Supplementary Material).  In Study 1 participants 
were presented with the NFCC subscales of preference for predictability and closed-mindedness (both 
were significantly or marginally predictive of conspiracy belief in the pilot study), and the Portrait 
Values Questionnaire (PVQ; Schwartz, 2003).  There were no effects of NFCC or values (see 
Supplementary Material).  These were therefore not included in Studies 2 and 3.  
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note however that these correlations arose from a small undergraduate student sample and we 
should therefore be cautious in drawing any strong conclusions from them.  Further, the 
correlations do not imply that there is a causal link between conspiracy belief and satisfaction 
with the status quo.  Our next step was therefore to experimentally examine whether belief in 
conspiracy theories responds to system threat.
 
Study 1 
This study employed a system threat manipulation adapted from previous research 
(Kay et al., 2005; Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi & Mosso, 2005) in which participants read 
a paragraph describing the social, economic, and political circumstances in the United 
Kingdom as either problematic (system threat) or not (system affirming).  This type of 
manipulation has previously been shown to decrease general satisfaction with the status quo 
immediately afterwards (see Jost et al., 2005).  This manipulation also motivates social-
cognitive efforts to restores the psychological legitimacy of the status quo, including victim 
derogation and enhancement (Kay et al., 2005), attraction to women who embody sexist 
ideals (Lau, Kay, & Spencer, 2008), and approval of gender inequality in the attainment of 
management positions (Kay et al., 2009).  Following this manipulation, participants rated 
their belief in conspiracy theories.  We argue that if the motivation to restore the status quo 
similarly motivates belief in conspiracy theories, then conspiracy belief should increase under 
system threat.  The opposite prediction holds if, instead, conspiracy beliefs undermine 
support for the status quo, in which case they should be rejected as additional system threats.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred twenty participants (52 men, 68 women, Mage = 34.54, SD = 10.08) were 
recruited via Crowd Flower, a crowdsourcing site similar to AmazonÕs Mechanical Turk.  
Participants were residents of the United Kingdom, and received a small monetary payment 
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in exchange for their participation.  The study was a between-groups design with two levels 
(system threat: threat vs. affirming).  An effect size (d) of 0.5 required a sample size of 
approximately 102 participants for 80% power of detecting the effect.  We therefore targeted 
117-122 participants, anticipating a 15-20% dropout.    
Materials and Procedure 
Adapting a procedure developed in previous work (Kay et al., 2005; Jost, et al., 
2005), participants were asked to read and memorize details of a journalistic paragraph that 
described the social, economic, and political circumstances in the United Kingdom as either 
problematic (system threat) or not (system affirming).  Participants assigned to the system 
threat condition read the following:  
These days, many people feel disappointed with the nationÕs condition. Many citizens 
feel that the country has reached a low point in terms of social, economic, and 
political factors. People do not feel as safe and secure as they used to, and there is a 
sense of uncertainty regarding the countryÕs future. It seems that many countries in 
the world, such as the United States and Western European, nations, are enjoying 
better social, economic, and political conditions than the UK. More and more British 
citizens express a willingness to leave the UK and immigrate to other nations. 
Participants in the system affirming condition read the following: 
These days, despite the difficulties the nation is facing, many people feel satisfied with 
the nationÕs condition. Many citizens feel that the UK has reached a stable point in 
terms of social, economic, and political factors. People feel safer and securer than 
they used to, and there is a sense of confidence and optimism regarding the countryÕs 
future. It seems that compared with many countries in the world the social, economic, 
and political conditions in the UK are relatively good. Fewer and fewer British 
citizens express a willingness to leave the UK and immigrate to other nations. 
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In previous studies across a variety of contexts, this manipulation has been found to decrease 
the perceived legitimacy of the status quo as expected (see Bobocel, Kay, Zanna & Olson, 
2010), and as including a manipulation check may have been leading for the participants, no 
manipulation check measures were therefore included in the current study.  Participants were 
then asked to complete the same conspiracy theory belief items as used in the pilot study, in 
which they rated their agreement with real-world conspiracy theories (α = .91), and general 
notions of conspiracy (α = .95).  At the conclusion of the study, the participants were 
debriefed in writing and thanked for their participation.  
Results and Discussion 
One-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) showed that as predicted, exposure to 
system threat influenced belief in both real-world conspiracy theories and general notions of 
conspiracy, F(1,118) = 4.36, p = .039, η
2
 = .04; F(1,118) = 5.32, p = .023, η
2
 = .05, 
respectively.  Specifically, endorsement of real-world conspiracy theories and general notions 
of conspiracy were significantly higher in the system threat condition (M = 3.79, SD = 1.34; 
M = 3.25, SD = 0.98, respectively) than the system affirming condition (M = 3.31, SD = 1.16; 
M = 2.85, SD = 0.96, respectively).   
This finding further supports the idea that conspiracy theories may perform a system-
justifying function.  It also echoes the findings of previous research demonstrating that 
people turn to conspiracy theories when they lack control (Sullivan, Landau & Rothschild, 
2010; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), and are uncertain (Newheiser et al., 2011; van Prooijen & 
Jostmann, 2013).  However, it does not show that adopting conspiracy theories helps people 
defend the system from threat.  Instead, system threat may have driven participants toward 
conspiracy theories as an alternative route to the satisfaction of psychological needs such as 
control (cf. Whitson et al., 2015).  To resolve this ambiguity, we experimentally examined 
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the effects of both system threat and conspiracy theorizing on satisfaction with the status quo 
by directly manipulating both variables. 
Study 2 
In this study we manipulated system threat, and also exposed (vs. did not expose) 
participants to conspiracy theories.  We measured participantsÕ satisfaction with the status 
quo.  If conspiracy theories help people defend the system from threat, the adverse effects of 
system threat on satisfaction with the status quo should be attenuated when conspiracy 
theories are also presented.  That is, under conditions of system threat, we would expect to 
see higher satisfaction from participants also exposed (vs. not) to conspiracy theories.  Thus, 
exposure to conspiracy theories buffers belief in the legitimacy of the status quo from threats. 
The opposite prediction holds if conspiracy theories offer an alternative route to 
psychological needs when system justification is rendered less tenable (Frster, Liberman, & 
Friedman 2007).  In this case, we would expect the adverse effects of system threat on 
satisfaction with the status quo to be amplified by exposure to conspiracy beliefs.  That is, 
under system threat, we would predict lower satisfaction from participants exposed (vs. not) 
to conspiracy theories.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred ninety undergraduate students from a British University (24 men and 
166 women, Mage = 19.99, SD = 5.32) received course credit in exchange for their 
participation.  Given the significant length of the conspiracy theory manipulation (which was 
580 words long and took M = 182.98 [SD = 167.33] seconds to read), and the system threat 
or affirming paragraphs (which were each 97 words long and took M = 52.67 [SD = 114.71] 
and M = 51.80 [SD = 76.51] seconds to read, respectively), a timer was used to identify 
participants who had not read both the manipulations fully, by spending less than 60 seconds 
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reading the conspiracy manipulation material and less than 10 seconds reading either the 
system threat or affirming paragraph and who had thus exceeded reading speed capabilities 
for upper college students (Speed Reading, 2014).  The 29 participants (16% of total sample) 
who failed the screening were removed from the analyses.  The final sample size used for 
data analysis was 159 (21 men and 139 women, Mage = 20.00, SD = 5.30). 
The study comprised a 2 (system threat: threat/affirming) x 2 (exposure to conspiracy 
theories: conspiracy/control) between-subjects design.  The dependent measure was 
participantsÕ satisfaction with the status quo as measured in the pilot study (Kay & Jost, 
2003).  An effect size (f) of 0.25 required a sample size of approximately 158 participants for 
80% power of detecting the effect.  We therefore targeted 182-190 participants, anticipating a 
15-20% drop out rate.    
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were first presented with the system threat (vs. affirming) manipulation, 
as in Study 1.  We then manipulated exposure to conspiracy theories by adapting a 
manipulation used by Douglas and Sutton (2008). Experimental participants were asked to 
read and memorize a piece of text concerning a conspiracy involving the death of Princess 
Diana.  Control participants proceeded directly to the dependent measures.  The conspiracy 
text included a series of eight bullet points outlining arguments that Princess DianaÕs death 
was not an accident.  The term conspiracy theory was not mentioned.  For example: 
ÒConcern has been raised about the rapid disposal of the bodies of Diana and Dodi. 
Diana had no post mortem prior to burial in Althorp. Victims of sudden death require 
a post mortem by law in the UK.Ó 
ÒImmediately after the crash news was broadcast, witnesses appeared on US TV 
saying that they heard an explosion or bang before they heard the car crash. Was this 
a gunshot, or a bomb?Ó 
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In previous work by Douglas and Sutton (2008), this manipulation has been shown to 
successfully increase belief in conspiracy theories.  As in Study 1, in order not to lead the 
participants and contaminate the result, no manipulation check measures were therefore 
included in the current study.  The full wording is available from the authors.  Finally, 
satisfaction with the status quo was measured using Kay and JostÕs (2003) general system 
justification scale (α = .63).  At the conclusion of the study, participants were debriefed in 
writing and were thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
As expected, a two-way ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between system 
threat and exposure to conspiracy theories, F(1, 156) = 7.70, p = .006, partial η
2
 = .054 (see 
Figure 1).  Supporting our hypothesis, there was a significant simple main effect of system 
threat in the conspiracy condition, F(1,75) = 4.06, p = .047, partial η
2
 = .066, such that those 
who were exposed to system threat reported higher satisfaction with the status quo (M = 4.95, 
SD = 0.60, n = 39), than those in the system affirming condition (M = 4.68, SD = 0.56, n = 
38).  As expected based on previous research (Bobocel et al., 2010), there was also a 
marginally significant simple main effect of system threat in the no conspiracy condition, 
F(1,81) = 3.90, p = .052, partial η
2
 = .048, but in the opposite direction, such that participants 
exposed to system threat reported lower satisfaction with the status quo (M = 4.48, SD = 0.80, 
n = 40), than those in the system affirming condition (M = 4.81, SD = 0.71, n = 43).     
Further analyses revealed a significant simple main effect of exposure to conspiracy 
theories when participants had been exposed to system threat, F(1,77) = 8.90, p = .004, 
partial η
2
 = .13, such that those in the system threat condition who were exposed to 
conspiracy theories reported higher satisfaction with the status quo (M = 4.95, SD = 0.60, n = 
39), than those in the control condition (M = 4.48, SD = 0.80, n = 40).  There was, however, 
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no simple main effect of exposure to conspiracy theories in the system affirming condition, 
F(1, 79) = 0.68, p = .410, partial η
2
 = .006.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
Participants under conditions of system threat reported the status quo as more 
legitimate after exposure to conspiracy theories.  In the context of threat to the social order, 
conspiracy theories may therefore allow people to preserve their sense that the social system 
is legitimate.  The final study tested our proposed mechanism for this effect Ð that conspiracy 
theories allow people to maintain positive views about social systems because they attribute 
negative events in society to a small number of conspirators within the social system.  
Study 3 
We exposed all participants to system threat and then half of the participants were 
exposed to conspiracy theories and half were not.  We asked all participants to rate the extent 
to which various social problems (e.g., pollution, inequality) are caused by individuals or 
small groups, as opposed to broader problems within the system.  Participants then rated their 
satisfaction with the status quo.  We expected to observe an indirect causal path in which 
participants exposed to conspiracy theories (vs. not) would be more likely to attribute societal 
problems to the actions of individuals and small groups than to inherent flaws in society, and 
in turn, to express increased satisfaction with the status quo.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred sixty six participants (76 men and 88 women, 1 transgender/other, and 1 
undisclosed, Mage = 36.07, SD = 12.04) were recruited via Crowd Flower as in the pilot study.  
Participants were residents of the United Kingdom, and received a small monetary payment 
in exchange for their participation.  As in Study 2, given the significant length of the 
conspiracy theory manipulation (which was 580 words long and took M = 132.47 [SD = 
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553.00] seconds to read), combined with the system threat manipulation (which was 97 
words long and took M = 32.71 [SD = 22.90] seconds to read), a timer was used to identify 
participants who had not read the manipulations fully, by spending less than 60 seconds 
reading the conspiracy manipulation material and less than 10 seconds reading the system 
threat manipulation and who had thus exceeded reading speed capabilities for upper college 
students (Speed Reading, 2014).  The 57 participants (34% of total sample) who failed the 
screening were removed from analyses.  The final sample size entered in data analysis was 
109 (51 men, 57 women and 1 transgendered/other, Mage = 37.66, SD = 12.32).  There were 
51 participants in the pro-conspiracy condition and 58 in the control.  
The study consisted of a two-group (exposure to conspiracy theories: 
conspiracy/control) between-subjects design where all participants were exposed to system 
threat.  The dependent measure was participantsÕ satisfaction with the status quo as measured 
in Studies 1, 2 and 3 (Kay & Jost, 2003).  The proposed mediator variable was the extent to 
which participants attributed societal problems to individuals and small groups or to 
problems inherent in society as a whole.  An effect size (f) of 0.25 required a sample size of 
approximately 128 participants for 80% power of detecting the effect.  We therefore targeted 
147-166 participants, anticipating a slightly higher 15-30% drop out rate due to the 
combination of two manipulations, as observed in Study 2.    
Materials and Procedure 
All participants were first presented with the system threat information as in the 
previous studies.  Participants were then exposed to a text highlighting various conspiracy 
theories about the death of Princess Diana (vs. control), as in Study 2.  Next, to measure the 
proposed mediator, participants were presented with nine problems that are facing society 
today (pollution, poverty, unemployment, inequality, crime, discrimination, overpopulation, 
conflict and war).  They were then asked to indicate the extent to which they thought these 
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problems were caused by individuals or society (ÒPlease indicate the extent to which you 
think these problems are due to the actions of individuals and small groups in society or due 
to fundamental flaws inherent in UK society, such as flawed laws, values, norms, institutions, 
or its political and economic systemÓ; 1 = individuals and small groups, 9 = flaws in UK 
society, α = .78).  Finally, satisfaction with the status quo was again measured using Kay and 
JostÕs (2003) scale (α = .81).  At the conclusion of the study, the participants were debriefed 
in writing and were thanked for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
Two separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted with exposure to conspiracy 
theories (conspiracy vs. control) as the independent variable, and satisfaction with the status 
quo and attributions for social problems as the two dependent variables.  As predicted, 
exposure to conspiracy theories influenced both satisfaction with the status quo, F(1, 107) = 
13.55, p <. 001, η
2
 = .13, and participantsÕ attributions for social problems, F(1, 107) = 5.18, 
p = .025, η
2
 = .06.  Specifically, participants who were exposed to conspiracy theories 
reported higher satisfaction with the status quo (M = 4.87, SD = 1.16), than those in the 
control condition (M = 4.01, SD = 1.27).  Further, participants who were exposed to 
conspiracy theories attributed societal problems to individuals and small groups rather than 
flaws in British society (M = 5.77, SD = 0.87), than those in the control condition (M = 6.24, 
SD = 1.21).  Put differently, their attributions shifted toward blaming individual actions for 
these problems.  
To test the predicted pattern of mediation between exposure to conspiracy theories 
and satisfaction with the status quo via attributions for social problems, we used Preacher and 
HayesÕ (2008) bootstrapped procedure designed for SPSS to run a simple mediation model.  
This method is based on 5000 bootstrapped re-samples used to describe the confidence 
intervals of indirect effects in a manner that makes no assumptions about the distribution of 
18 
 
 
 
the indirect effects.  Interpretation of the bootstrap data is accomplished by determining 
whether zero is contained within the 95% confidence intervals (CIs).  An indirect effect is 
estimated as being significant if the 95% confidence intervals (CIs) do not contain a zero.  
Results (see Figure 2) demonstrated a significant indirect effect of exposure to conspiracy 
theories and system justification beliefs through attributions for significant social problems 
(LLCI = -.5667, ULCI = -.0621).   
[Figure 2 about here] 
Under system threat, exposure to conspiracy theories increased satisfaction with the 
status quo relative to a control condition.  This effect was mediated by participantsÕ 
attributions for social problems.  Those who were exposed (vs. not exposed) to conspiracy 
theories shifted attributions for societyÕs problems from institutional and systemic causes 
toward individuals and small groups.  Conspiracy theories may therefore enable people to 
justify social systems by suggesting that social problems are the fault of a small number of 
people rather than inherent flaws in their society. 
General Discussion 
Intuition, popular belief, proponents, and several scholars suggest that conspiracy 
theories have the power to subvert social systems (e.g., Gray, 2010; Sapuountzis & Condor, 
2013).  Although some research shows that conspiracy belief undermines trust in and 
compliance with authority (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014a), its effect on overall perceptions of the legitimacy of social systems had not 
been researched previously.  The present results suggest that far from undermining system 
justification, conspiracy theories may actually bolster the social status quo.  Conspiracy belief 
was found to increase when the legitimacy of social systems was threatened (Study 1).  
Exposure to conspiracy theories was shown to buffer satisfaction with the status quo from 
threat (Study 2), and was shown to do so via an indirect causal path in which it caused people 
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to increasingly attribute societyÕs problems to malevolent individuals, rather than systemic 
causes (Study 3).   
Conspiracy theories therefore appear to function as a means to defend the social 
system when its legitimacy is under threat.  In this respect they join the ranks of other 
system-justifying processes such as complementary stereotyping of the poor, sexist ideology, 
and just world belief (Calogero & Jost, 2011; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990; Jost, 2001; Jost & 
Hunyady, 2005).  Conspiracy theories, to be sure, cast doubt on the motives and legitimacy of 
people in authority positions. They draw attention to some of the most tragic and worrisome 
events of modern life.  However they may often do so in a way that appears to divert people 
from questioning inherent limitations of their society.   
It is important to acknowledge some limitations of the current research.  We note 
that although the effects reported here are statistically robust, they are relatively small.  
Further, participants were British, and were presented with a single, uniquely British, 
example of alleged conspiracy (Studies 2 and 3).  It is possible that in some geographical and 
political settings, and at certain points in time, conspiracy theories may satisfy the need to 
justify the system, but in other settings they may not.  The current findings therefore require 
replication in different contexts.  Also, the participants contained relatively few genuine 
adherents of conspiracy theories.  This leaves open the (plausible) prospect that fervent 
commitment to conspiracy theories, as opposed to exposure or openness to them, radicalizes 
political opinion and motivates social change (Uscinski & Parent, 2014).  Strong commitment 
to conspiracy theories may lead people to believe that corruption and malice are endemic 
across different branches of the social system, and so make it incoherent to psychologically 
quarantine them by blaming individuals for societyÕs problems.  We therefore cannot be 
confident about the extent to which the present results will generalize to other populations 
and other conspiracy theories.   
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 Although boundary conditions are not yet known, the present results clearly show 
that sometimes, conspiracy theories strengthen rather than weaken support for extant social 
systems.  This entails that conspiracy theories are not necessarily subversive, and poses a 
new research challenge Ð to determine when and how conspiracy theories do, and do not, 
buttress the status quo.  For example, while conspiracy theories may bolster support for a 
threatened social system at a general level, they encourage subversive opinions at a more 
specific level (e.g., distrust of political leaders and scientific orthodoxy).  Such views may 
have the effect of motivating social change even if people do not express general objections 
to the status quo.  However, Jolley and Douglas (2014a) have shown that exposure to 
conspiracy theories weakens political engagement.  This suggests an additional mechanism 
by which conspiracy theories may reduce, rather than increase, the likelihood of social and 
political change.   
The present results, and the present analysis of the function of conspiracy theories, 
resonate with an important distinction made by political scientists, but paid little attention by 
psychologists.  Specifically, trust in governments can be distinguished sharply from support 
for systems of government (Citrin, 1974; Easton, 1975; Levi & Stoker, 2000).  Thus, 
Òindividuals can express a sense of pride in their political system while at the same time 
exhibiting very low trust in governmentÓ (Muller, Jukam, & Seligson, 1982, p. 242).  Indeed, 
Muller et al. found that illegitimate forms of political dissent were predicted not by distrust in 
government but by rejection of the political system.  Measures of trust in government have 
been shown to have a robust, negative relation to conspiracy belief (e.g., Abalakina-Paap et 
al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994).  However, instead of assessing fundamental rejection or even 
distrust of the political system, such scales may only pick up Òevaluations of the general 
performance of various incumbents, who are vaguely called to mind by the collective term 
ÔpoliticiansÕ or Ôthe governmentÕÓ (Easton, 1975, p. 45). The present results suggest that by 
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pointing fingers at individuals Ð even groups of individuals charged with operating the 
system Ð conspiracy theories may exonerate the system, just as blaming a driver for a car 
crash shifts blame from the car.   
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Figure 1.  Mean system-justifying beliefs as a function of exposure to conspiracy theories 
and system threat.  Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2. Mediation model of the relationship between exposure to conspiracy theories and 
satisfaction with the status quo through attributions for social problems. 
Note. **p<.05, ***p<.001. 
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